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ABSTRACT In this paper, the impacts of unreliable backhaul links on the secrecy performance of cooperative
single carrier heterogeneous networks in the presence of eavesdroppers are investigated. A two-phase
transmitter/relay selection scheme is proposed, where the best transmitter is selected to maximize signal-
to-noise ratio at the relays in the first phase and the best relay is chosen in the second phase to minimize the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the eavesdroppers with the aid of a friendly jammer. Closed-form
expressions are derived for the secrecy outage probability, probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate,
and ergodic secrecy rate. The asymptotic performance analysis is furthermore performed to explicitly reveal
the impacts of unreliable backhaul links on the secrecy performance. Our results show that the diversity gain
cannot be achieved in the presence of imperfect backhaul links.
INDEX TERMS Unreliable backhaul, heterogeneous networks, frequency selective fading, secrecy outage
probability, ergodic secrecy rate, physical layer security, single carrier system.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the concept of physical layer sec-
urity (PLS) has gained vast attention now that the presence
of malicious eavesdroppers has caused bad effects on the
transmission of confidential information in wireless com-
munication systems [1]. Different from upper layer security
where the message is encrypted/decrypted with specific key
secretly shared between the source and destination, PLS per-
forms the information-theoretical approach to gain the benefit
from the physical characteristics in preventing eavesdropping
attacks [2]. These PLS methods entail cooperative relaying
and/or exploiting the aid of jamming signals such that the
confidential message is securely acquired at the receiver.
To satisfy the exponential increase in the number of users
and data traffic, network infrastructure has grown towards
higher density and heterogeneity [3]. In such heterogeneous
networks (HetNets), besides the threats of eavesdropping, one
of the critical problems is unreliable backhaul links or back-
haul reliability, which has attracted considerable interest in
the existing literature [4]–[10]. The network performance
in HetNets currently has to depend on unreliable backhaul
communication since the signals transmitted via wireless
backhaul links are impacted by multiple propagation fading,
i.e., small and large scale fading, as well as transmission delay
and synchronization among transceivers [11], [12]. Thus,
the transmissions via backhaul links are not intrinsically
reliable in the context of wireless communication systems.
It has been shown that the presence of unreliable backhaul
links strongly deteriorates the network performance since
the asymptotic limitation is mainly determined by reliability
levels [6], [7].
Among the recent studies on PLS, the opportunis-
tic cooperative relay approach has been examined for
both decode-and-forward (DF) [13], [14] and amplify-and-
forward (AF) [2], [15] relaying schemes. These studies
have attempted to minimize the overheard information by
degrading the achievable signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the
eavesdroppers. This approach demonstrates the ability of
preventing the leakage of confidential information. However,
such prevention cannot be guaranteed when the number of
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eavesdroppers increases. To tackle this problem, a friendly
jammer has been incorporated to generate interference sig-
nals towards eavesdroppers [16]–[19]. It has been shown that
the secrecy rate is significantly enhanced with the help of
jammers.
While PLS enables the confidential message to success-
fully arrive at the legitimate destination, most of the previous
PLSworks have assumed ideal wireless backhaul links. In the
context of HetNets, this assumption, however, is impractical.
The presence of unreliable backhaul has been investigated rel-
ative to the scaling of the network performance. For example,
the authors in [4]–[6] developed the analytical frameworks
to examine the performance of cooperative wireless systems.
Additionally, the investigation on backhaul reliability was
extended to spectrum sharing environments by considering
the primary user interference constraints [7]–[9]. However,
without considering the presence of eavesdroppers, the infor-
mation between the source and destination could be left
vulnerable. Very recently, the impacts of backhaul reliability
have been examined in the presence of multiple eavesdrop-
pers [10]. Nevertheless, the authors have not exploited coop-
erative jamming in the preventing of eavesdroppers, where a
single relay is adopted.
From these observations, it can be seen that PLS in the
presence of unreliable backhaul links has not been completely
investigated yet. Motivated by this, in this paper we investi-
gate the secrecy performance of single carrier systems taking
into account cooperative jamming.1 Our main contributions
are summarized as follows:
• We investigate the secrecy performance of coopera-
tive HetNets by exploiting cooperative relay and jam-
ming signals in the presence of unreliable backhaul
links between macro-cells and small-cells. Specifically,
the context of cycle prefixed single carrier (CP-SC)
transmission2 is employed to avoid inter-symbol inter-
ference (ISI) [20], [22]. Moreover, we consider fre-
quency selective fading channels in the network since
multipath components in practical scenarios usually
reflect the transmission signals between senders and
receivers [10], [14].
• By taking into account dense networks, we apply the
best relay selection in multi-relay networks. In partic-
ular, we propose a two-phase transmitter/relay selec-
tion scheme. The achievable SNR at the relays is
maximized by applying the best transmitter selection
in/during the first phase and the relay selection scheme is
deployed in/during the second phase such that the instan-
taneous signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
at the eavesdroppers is minimized.
1Unlike [10], we exploit the PLS in the context of multiple relays to
highlight the impact of dense networks.
2The ISI is generated if the coherence bandwidth is smaller than the signal
bandwidth, which could lead to the distortion of the transmit signals.With the
aid of CP-SC, the ISI can be prevented by attaching the additional prefixes
in front of the transmit symbol block and repeating until the end [20], [21].
• The secrecy outage probability, probability of non-zero
achievable secrecy rate, and ergodic secrecy rate are
derived in closed-form to analyze the secrecy perfor-
mance of the network. The asymptotic secrecy expres-
sions are also attained to gain full insights into the
impact of backhaul reliability on the network secrecy
performance in the high SNR regime.
• We show that the number of multipath components and
the degrees of cooperative transmission significantly
impact the scaling of secrecy performance. More impor-
tantly, backhaul reliability is shown as an important
factor in PLS system design, which strongly affects the
achievable secrecy performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the network and channel models of the proposed
cooperative single-carrier systems. Our proposed two-phase
transmitter/relay selection scheme is detailed in Section III.
In Section IV, the analysis is provided to obtain the closed-
form expressions for secrecy performance metrics. Numer-
ical results are presented in Section V and conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
Notation: CN (µ, σ 2n ) denotes the complex Gaussian distri-
bution with mean µ and variance σ 2n ; Im is an m×m identity
matrix; Cm×n is vector space of m × n complex matrices;
X ∼ χ2 (NX , αX ) denotes chi-square distribution with degree
of freedom (DoF) NX and power normalizing constant αX .
Fλ(γ ) and fλ(γ ) denote the cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) and probability density function (PDF) of the
random variable (RV) λ, respectively; Eλ {f (γ )} denotes the
expectation of f (γ ) with respect to the RV λ. In addition,(
τ1
τ2
) = τ1!
τ2!(τ1 − τ2) denotes the binomial coefficient.
II. NETWORK AND CHANNEL MODELS
We consider a HetNet as illustrated in Fig. 1. In this network,
there is a macro-cell base station (Macro-BS) connected
to the core network. Also, K small-cell transmitters Tk ,
k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K }, are connected to the Macro-BS via unreli-
able backhaul links. These K small-cell transmitters commu-
nicate with a user D viaM DF relays Rm,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}.
Furthermore, there are a single jammer J and N eavesdrop-
pers En, n ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,N }, in the network. We assume
that there is no direct link between Tk and D or between
Tk and En due to poor channel conditions, ∀k ∈ K ,∀n ∈ N .
All the transmitters and receivers are equipped with a single
antenna3 and operate in half-duplexmode. The eavesdroppers
cooperate to overhear the transmissions between Rm and D
while J generates interference directly to the eavesdroppers.4
For a cooperative CP-SC system, we make the following
assumptions:
3Note that the jammer in this model is equippedwith a single antenna. This
assumption is common since a multiple-antenna jamming node may not be
available due to the cost, power, and size limitations [19].
4In order to obtain the optimal relays weights, we suppose that J and D
cooperate with each other. Thus, the complete nulling of jamming signal at
D can be achieved [2], [18].
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FIGURE 1. The network model of a cooperative single carrier HetNet,
where small-cell transmitters connect to the macro-cell via unreliable
backhaul links. The PLS exploiting the cooperative relay and the aid of
jamming signals is taken into account in the presence of eavesdroppers.
• All channels in the considered network are assumed
to undergo frequency selective fading. For example,
the channel between Tk and Rm, ∀k,m, which is denoted
by hk,m
4= [hk,m1 , . . . , hk,mNR ]T ∈ CNR×1, consists of NR
multipath components. The corresponding path loss
component over hk,m is denoted as αk,mT .
• Similarly, the channel between Rm and En, ∀m, n, which
is denoted by gm,n
4= [gm,n1 , . . . , gm,nNE ]T ∈ CNE×1, con-
sists of NE multipath components. The corresponding
path loss component over gm,n is denoted as αm,nE .
• The channel between Rm and D, ∀m and the chan-
nel between J and En, ∀n, which are denoted by
f m
4= [f m1 , . . . , f mND ]T ∈ CND×1 and qn
4= [qn1, . . . , qnNJ ]T∈ CNJ×1, consist of ND and NJ multipath components,
respectively. The corresponding path loss component
over f m and qn are denoted by αmD and α
n
J , respectively.
• The transmit symbol block x ∈ CS×1 and interference
signal v ∈ CS×1 are transmitted from the Macro-BS and
J, respectively, with a symbol block size of S.We assume
that E[x] = E[v] = 0 and E[||x||2] = E[||v||2] = IS .
• The maximum multipath components in the network is
denoted byNmax = max (NR,NE ,NJ ,ND). To avoid the
ISI and interblock symbol interference (IBSI) [21], [23],
a CP comprised of additional Nadd symbols is added in
front of the transmit symbol x, where Nadd ≥ Nmax .
In the considered network, the channel state informa-
tion (CSI) is assumed to be perfectly known at the relays, J,
and D for all active links, since it is a common assumption
for PLS literature [2], [10], [24]. Also, we assume that the
information5 from the eavesdroppers can be measured by
5Information here is the achievable CSI of the eavesdroppers, in which the
jammer uses this information to calculate and forward the SINR to the relays
for the cooperative PLS purpose.
J in the network [25]. As the transmit symbol block x is
transmitted from theMacro-BS, it must pass through the ded-
icated wireless backhaul links. Due to the nature of wireless
channels, the reception status at the K transmitters is pre-
sented by success/failure transmission. Thus, the reliability
of the wireless backhaul links follows a Bernoulli process Ik ,
i.e., the message is successfully received at the receivers with
a successful probability of λk [4], [7]. The failure probability
is accordingly given by 1− λk .
Due to multipath fading, the received signal at Rm from Tk
is given by
yk,mR =
√
Ptαk,mT Hk,mIkx+ nk,mR , (1)
wherePt is the transmit power andHk,m is the right circulant
matrix [20], [26] with the corresponding channel vector hk,m,
and nk,mR ∼ CN
(
0, σ 2n IS
)
is an additive noise vector at
Rm. Ik recalls the backhaul reliability which is modeled as a
Bernoulli process.6 From (1), the instantaneous SNR between
Tk and Rm in the first time slot can be expressed as
γ
k,m
R =
Ptαk,mT ||hk,m||2
σ 2n
Ik = α˜k,mT ||hk,m||2Ik , (2)
where α˜k,mT
4= Ptα
k,m
T
σ 2n
and α˜k,mT ||hk,m||2 ∼ χ2
(
2NR, α˜
k,m
T
)
.
The received signals at En and D from Rm are, respectively,
given by
ym,nE =
√
Prαm,nE Gm,nx+
√
PjαnJQnv+ nm,nE ,
ymD =
√
PrαmDFmx+ nmD, (3)
where Pr and Pj are the transmit powers at the relays and J,
respectively, Gm,n,Qn, and Fm are the right circulant matrix
with the corresponding channel vectors gm,n, qn, and f m,
respectively, nm,nE ∼ CN (0, σ 2n IS ) and nmD ∼ CN (0, σ 2n IS )
denote the noise vectors at En and D.
Thus, the instantaneous SINR between Rm and En can be
written as
γ
m,n
E =
Prαm,nE ||gm,n||2
σ 2n + PjαnJ ||qn||2
= α˜
m,n
E ||gm,n||2
1+ α˜nJ ||qn||2
, (4)
where α˜m,nE
4= Prα
m,n
E
σ 2n
, α˜nJ
4= Pjα
n
J
σ 2n
, α˜m,nE ||gm,n||2 ∼
χ2
(
2NE , α˜
m,n
E
)
, and α˜nJ ||qn||2 ∼ χ2
(
2NJ , α˜nJ
)
.
In the second time slot, the instantaneous SNR between Rm
and D can be expressed as
γmD =
PrαmD ||f m||2
σ 2n
= α˜mD ||f m||2, (5)
where α˜mD
4= Prα
m
D
σ 2n
and γmD ∼ χ2
(
2ND, α˜mD
)
.
6Since the transmission via backhaul link is not guaranteed, the message
transmitted via backhaul link can be successfully received or dropped. Thus,
it is common to model the backhaul reliability by Bernoulli process, which
canonically performs success/failure transmission [4]–[8], [10].
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Since all the channels are assumed to undergo fre-
quency selective fading, they are distributed according to
chi-square distribution. Thus, the CDF and PDF of the
RV X ∼ χ2 (2NX , α˜X ) are given by [10], [14]
FX (x) = 1− e−x/α˜X
NX−1∑
l=0
1
l!
(
x
α˜X
)l
,
fX (x) = 1(˜αX )NX (NX − 1)!x
NX−1e−x/α˜X , (6)
respectively.We assume that the unreliable backhaul links are
independent from the indices of the K transmitters, i.e., λk =
λ,∀k . We also assume that the set of path loss components
{αk,mT , αm,nE , αnJ , αmD} is identically varied among the K trans-
mitters,M relays andN eavesdroppers, i.e., it can be rewritten
as αT = αk,mT , αE = αm,nE , αJ = αnJ , αD = αmD,∀k,m, n.
III. THE TWO-PHASE TRANSMITTER/RELAY
SELECTION SCHEME
Our approach for achieving high PLS level is the proposed
two-phase selection scheme which maximizes the achievable
performance while reducing the performance at the eaves-
droppers as much as possible. In the first phase, each relay
chooses the best transmitter among the K small-cells to max-
imize their achievable SNR. The selected transmitter can be
mathematically expressed as
Phase 1: k∗ = arg max
k=1,...,K γ
k,m
R , (7)
where γ k,mR recalls the instantaneous SNR at Rm via Tk .
From (7), the statistical property of the instantaneous SNR
via the best transmitter Tk∗ is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Given K independent and identical unreliable
backhaul connections, the CDF of the received SNR at Rm via
the best transmitter is given as
F
γ
k∗,m
R
(x) = 1+
K∑
k=1
k∑
ω1,...,ωNR
(
K
k
)(
k!
ω1! . . . ωNR !
)
× (−1)
kλk∏NR−1
t=0 (t!(˜αT )t)ωt+1
x
∑NR−1
t=0 tωt+1e−kx/α˜T .
(8)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A. 
In the second phase, one relay is selected such that the
SINR between the particular relay and N eavesdroppers is
minimized. It can be formulated as
Phase 2: m∗ = arg min
m=1,...,M γ
m,n∗
E , (9)
where γm,n
∗
E = max (γm,1E , . . . , γm,NE ) is the maximum
instantaneous SINR between Rm and N eavesdroppers. The
CDF of the RV γm,n
∗
E is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For the independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) frequency selective fading channels, the CDF
of the instantaneous SINR between Rm and N eavesdroppers
is given as
F
γ
m,n∗
E
(x) =
∑̂
N ,n,NE
e−ϕN1 xxϕN2
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−ϕN3
, (10)
where ϕN1
4= n/α˜E , ϕN2
4= ∑NE−1t=0 tϑt+1, ϕN3 4= ∑0η1=0(NJ +
η1)µ1,η1+1+
∑1
η2=0(NJ +η2)µ2,η2+1+ . . .+
∑NE−1
ηNE=0(NJ +
ηNE )µNE ,ηNE+1 and
∑̂
N ,n,NE
is the shorthand notation given by
(11) at the top of next page.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B. 
GivenM independent relays, the statistical property of the
achievable SINR at the eavesdroppers via Rm is given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2: For the i.i.d. frequency selective fading chan-
nels, the PDF of the instantaneous SINR between Rm and the
eavesdroppers, denoted by γm
∗,n∗
E , is given by (12) at the top
of next page.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C. 
Since the DF relaying protocol is adopted at the relays,
the selected relay processes the received information and then
directly forward to D. The instantaneous end-to-end SNR at
D from the m∗-th relay, denoted by γ˜m∗DF , is mathematically
given by
γ˜m
∗
DF = min(γ k
∗,m∗
R , γ
m∗
D ), (14)
where γm
∗
D recalls the instantaneous SNR between the m
∗-th
relay and D in the second time slot. The CDF of the RV γm
∗
D
is given as
F
γm
∗
D
(x) = 1− e−x/α˜D
ND−1∑
q=0
1
q!
(
x
α˜D
)q
. (15)
According to (14), the statistical property of the instan-
taneous end-to-end SNR at D γ˜m
∗
DF can be obtained by the
following theorem.
Theorem 3: For the proposed cooperative HetNet with
unreliable backhaul links, the CDF of the instantaneous SNR
at D via the m∗-th relay is given by
F
γ˜m
∗
DF
(x) = 1+
∑˜
D
xβe−8x , (16)
where β = ∑NR−1t=0 tωt+1 + q, 8 = k/α˜T + 1/α˜D and ∑˜
D
is
the shorthand notation of∑˜
D
=
K∑
k=1
ND−1∑
q=0
k∑
ω1,...,ωNR
(
K
k
)(
k!
ω1! . . . ωNR !
)
× (−1)kλk 1
q!∏NR−1t=0 (t!(˜αT )t)ωt+1
(
1
α˜D
)q
. (17)
Proof: According to the definition of RV γ˜m
∗
DF , which is
given in (14), the CDF of γ˜m
∗
DF can be expressed as
F
γ˜m
∗
DF
(x) = 1− [1− F
γ
k∗,m∗
R
(x)][1− F
γm
∗
D
(x)]. (18)
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∑̂
N ,n,NE
=
N∑
n=0
n∑
ϑ1,...,ϑNE
ϑ1∑
µ1,1
ϑ2∑
µ2,1,µ2,2
. . .
ϑNE∑
µNE ,1,...,µNE ,NE
(
N
n
)
(−1)n
(
n!
ϑ1! . . . ϑNE !
)(
ϑ1!
µ1,1!
)(
ϑ2!
µ2,1!µ2,2!
)
. . .
×
(
ϑNE !
µNE ,1! . . . µNE ,NE !
)(
1
(˜αJ )NJ (NJ − 1)!
)n 1∏NE−1
t=0 (t!(˜αE )t)ϑt+1
0∏
η1=0
[(
0
η1
)
0(NJ + η1)
]µ1,η1+1
×
1∏
η2=0
[(
1
η2
)
0(NJ + η2)
]µ2,η2+1
. . .
NE−1∏
ηNE=0
[(
NE − 1
ηNE
)
0(NJ + ηNE )
]µNE ,ηNE +1
. (11)
f
γ
m∗,n∗
E
(x) = Q
∑˜
E
e−ϕ˜1 x
(
B1 x ϕ˜2 − B2 x ϕ˜2−1 + B3x ϕ˜2+1
)( 1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−ϕ˜3
, (12)
whereQ 4= MN
(˜αJ )NJ (NJ − 1)! , B1
4= 1/α˜J + NJ + j− i
α˜E
, B2 4= i
α˜J
, B3 4= 1(˜αE )2 , ϕ˜1
4= 1/α˜E+ϕN−11 +ϕmN1 , ϕ˜2
4=ϕN−12 +ϕmN2 + i,
ϕ˜3
4=ϕN−13 + ϕmN3 + NJ + j+ 1 and
∑˜
E
is the shorthand notation of
∑˜
E
4=
∑̂
N−1,l,NE
∑̂
mN ,r,NE
M−1∑
m=0
NE−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
M − 1
m
)(
i
j
)
(−1)m 1
i!(˜αE )i0(NJ + j). (13)
By substituting (8) and (15) into (18) and after some simple
manipulations, the CDF of instantaneous end-to-end SNR at
D is obtained as in (16). 
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate the secrecy performance of the
proposed network based on the statistical properties derived
in Section III. We first focus on the secrecy outage probabil-
ity, where the eavesdroppers’s CSI is assumed unavailable in
the considered network. In this case, the transmitters encode
and send the confidential message with the constant secrecy
rate of θ . If the instantaneous secrecy capacity, denoted by
CS in bits/s/Hz, is greater than θ , the secrecy gain is guar-
anteed. Otherwise, information-theoretic security is compro-
mised [27]. The asymptotic secrecy outage probability is then
attained to study the asymptotic behavior of the proposed
network.
The secrecy capacity CS can be expressed as [28]
CS = 12
[
log2(1+ γ˜m
∗
DF )− log2(1+ γm
∗,n∗
E )
]+
, (19)
where log2(1+γ˜m∗DF ) is the instantaneous capacity at D respect
to the m∗-th relay and log2(1 + γm
∗,n∗
E ) is the instantaneous
capacity of the wiretap channel between the m∗-th relay and
n∗-th eavesdropper.
A. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The secrecy outage probability, which is defined as the prob-
ability that the secrecy capacity falls below the given rate
threshold, can be expressed as [14], [29]
Pout (θ ) = Pr(CS < θ)
=
∫ ∞
0
F
γ˜m
∗
DF
(
22θ (1+ x)− 1
)
f
γ
m∗,n∗
E
(x) dx. (20)
From (20), the closed-from expression for the secrecy outage
probability is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: For the cooperative single-carrier HetNet
with unreliable backhaul links, the secrecy outage probability
with two-phase transmitter/relay selection scheme is given as
in (21) at the top of next page.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D. 
To provide full insights into the impacts of unreliable back-
haul connections, the asymptotic expression for the secrecy
outage probability is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 5: Given the fixed set {˜αT , α˜E , α˜J }, the asymp-
totic expression for secrecy outage probability is given as (22)
at the top of next page.
Proof: Observing the CDF of RV γm
∗
D in (15), we find
that e−x/α˜D
α˜D→∞≈ 1 and∑ND−1q=0 is dominated by q = 0 when
α˜D→∞. Thus,
lim
α˜D→∞
F
γm
∗
D
(x) ≈ 0, (23)
which yields the CDF of the instantaneous end-to-end SNR
of D as
F
γ˜m
∗
DF
(x) = 1+
∑˜
D∞
x β˜e−8˜x . (24)
By substituting (12) and (24) into (20), the asymptotic outage
probability is obtained as in (22). 
From (22), we observe that since the backhaul links
are unreliable, the secrecy diversity gain is not achievable.
Furthermore, the asymptotic secrecy outage is independent
of DoF of channels between relay and D. Thus, the lim-
itation on secrecy outage probability is determined as a
constant.
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Pout (θ ) = 1+Q
∑˜
D
∑˜
E
β∑
α=0
(
β
α
)
(ϒ − 1)β−α(ϒ)αα˜ϕ˜3E e−8 (ϒ−1)(O1 −O2 +O3), (21)
where ϒ
4= 22θ ,  4= α˜E
α˜J
and
O1 = B10(ϕ˜2 + α + 1)ϕ˜2+α+1−ϕ˜39 (ϕ˜2 + α + 1, ϕ˜2 + α + 2− ϕ˜3, (8ϒ + ϕ˜1)),
O2 = B20(ϕ˜2 + α)ϕ˜2+α−ϕ˜39 (ϕ˜2 + α, ϕ˜2 + α + 1− ϕ˜3, (8ϒ + ϕ˜1)),
O3 = B30(ϕ˜2 + α + 2)ϕ˜2+α+2−ϕ˜39 (ϕ˜2 + α + 2, ϕ˜2 + α + 3− ϕ˜3, (8ϒ + ϕ˜1)).
P∞out (θ ) α˜D→∞= 1+Q
∑˜
D∞
∑˜
E
β˜∑
α=0
(
β˜
α
)
(ϒ − 1)β˜−α(ϒ)αα˜ϕ˜3E e−8˜(ϒ−1)(Ô1 − Ô2 + Ô3), (22)
where β˜ =∑NR−1t=0 tωt+1, 8˜ = kα˜T , ∑˜D∞ =∑Kk=1∑kω1,...,ωNR (Kk )
(
k!
ω1! . . . ωNR !
)
(−1)k−1λk∏NR−1
t=0 (t!(˜αT )t)ωt+1
, and
Ô1 = B10(ϕ˜2 + α + 1)ϕ˜2+α+1−ϕ˜39
(
ϕ˜2 + α + 1, ϕ˜2 + α + 2− ϕ˜3, (8˜ϒ + ϕ˜1)
)
,
Ô2 = B20(ϕ˜2 + α)ϕ˜2+α−ϕ˜39
(
ϕ˜2 + α, ϕ˜2 + α + 1− ϕ˜3, (8˜ϒ + ϕ˜1)
)
,
Ô3 = B30(ϕ˜2 + α + 2)ϕ˜2+α+2−ϕ˜39
(
ϕ˜2 + α + 2, ϕ˜2 + α + 3− ϕ˜3, (8˜ϒ + ϕ˜1)
)
.
B. THE PROBABILITY OF NON-ZERO ACHIEVABLE
SECRECY RATE
In wiretap channels, the probability of non-zero achievable
secrecy rate is defined as the probability of the positive
secrecy rate, which can be achieved if γ˜m
∗
DF > γ
m∗,n∗
E is
satisfied. The probability of positive secrecy expression is
given by [28]
Pr(CS > 0) = 1− Pout (0)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
F
γ˜m
∗
DF
(x) f
γ
m∗,n∗
E
(x) dx. (25)
Thus, the closed-form expression for the probability of
non-zero achievable secrecy rate is given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 6: For the cooperative single-carrier HetNet
with respect to unreliable backhaul links, the probability of
non-zero achievable secrecy rate with two-phase transmit-
ter/relay selection scheme is given as in (26) at the top of next
page.
Proof: By applying the same process as in Theorem 4,
the closed-form expression for Pr(CS > 0) can be obtained
with the help of [30, eq. (2.3.6.9)]. Thus, we arrive at (26). 
To investigate the asymptotic behavior of the probability
of non-zero achievable secrecy rate in high SNR regime,
the asymptotic expression is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 7: Given the fixed set {˜αT , α˜E , α˜J }, the asymp-
totic probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate is given
as in (27) at the top of next page.
Proof: The proof is similarly as in Theorem 5.
As α˜D→∞, we have
F
γ˜m
∗
DF
(x)
α˜D→∞= 1+
∑˜
D∞
x β˜e−8˜x . (28)
By substituting (28) and (12) into (25), we arrive at (27). 
C. ERGODIC SECRECY RATE
The ergodic secrecy rate expression is given by [31]
Cerg = E
{
1
2
log2
(
1+ γ˜m∗DF
1+ γm∗,n∗E
)}
= 1
2 ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
F
γ
m∗,n∗
E
(x)
1+ x [1− Fγ˜m∗DF (x)]dx, (29)
where
F
γ
m∗,n∗
E
(x) =
∫ x
0
f
γ
m∗,n∗
E
(t) dt. (30)
The closed-form expression for ergodic secrecy rate is given
in the following theorem.
Theorem 8: For the cooperative single-carrier HetNet
with unreliable backhaul links, the ergodic secrecy rate with
two-phase transmitter/relay selection scheme is given as in
(31) at the top of next page.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix E. 
Theorem 9: Given the fixed set {˜αT , α˜E , α˜J }, the asymp-
totic ergodic secrecy rate is given as (32) at the top of next
page.
Proof: Since α˜D→∞, we observe that
F
γ˜m
∗
DF
(x)
α˜D→∞= 1+
∑˜
D∞
x β˜e−8˜x . (33)
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Pr(CS > 0) = −Q
∑˜
D
∑˜
E
α˜
ϕ˜3
E (N1 −N2 +N3), (26)
where
N1 = B10(ϕ˜2 + β + 1)ϕ˜2+β+1−ϕ˜39 (ϕ˜2 + β + 1, ϕ˜2 + β + 2− ϕ˜3, (8+ ϕ˜1)) ,
N2 = B20(ϕ˜2 + β)ϕ˜2+β−ϕ˜39 (ϕ˜2 + β, ϕ˜2 + β + 1− ϕ˜3, (8+ ϕ˜1)) ,
N3 = B30(ϕ˜2 + β + 2)ϕ˜2+β+2−ϕ˜39 (ϕ˜2 + β + 2, ϕ˜2 + β + 3− ϕ˜3, (8+ ϕ˜1)) .
Pr(C∞S > 0)
α˜D→∞= −Q
∑˜
D∞
∑˜
E
α˜
ϕ˜3
E (N̂1 − N̂2 + N̂3), (27)
where
N̂1 = B10(ϕ˜2 + β˜ + 1)ϕ˜2+β˜+1−ϕ˜39
(
ϕ˜2 + β˜ + 1, ϕ˜2 + β˜ + 2− ϕ˜3, (8˜+ ϕ˜1)
)
,
N̂2 = B20(ϕ˜2 + β˜)ϕ˜2+β˜−ϕ˜39
(
ϕ˜2 + β˜, ϕ˜2 + β˜ + 1− ϕ˜3, (8˜+ ϕ˜1)
)
,
N̂3 = B30(ϕ˜2 + β˜ + 2)ϕ˜2+β˜+2−ϕ˜39
(
ϕ˜2 + β˜ + 2, ϕ˜2 + β˜ + 3− ϕ˜3, (8˜+ ϕ˜1)
)
.
Cerg = − 12 ln(2)
∑˜
D
0(β + 1)9 (β + 1, β + 1,8)
−
∑˜
D
M∑
h=0
(
M
h
)
(−1)hα˜ϕ
hN
3
J
∑̂
hN ,v,NE
(8+ ϕhN1 )−ϕ
hN
2 −β−1
0(ϕhN3 )
H1,1,1,1,11,(1:1),0,(1:1)

1
8+ ϕhN1
1
(8+ ϕhN1 )
∣∣∣∣
(1+ϕhN2 +β,1)
(0,1);(1−ϕhN3 ,1)
−
(0,1);(0,1)

,
(31)
C∞erg α˜D→∞= −
1
2 ln(2)
∑˜
D∞
0(β˜ + 1)9
(
β˜ + 1, β˜ + 1, 8˜
)
−
∑˜
D∞
M∑
h=0
(
M
h
)
(−1)hα˜ϕ
hN
3
J
∑̂
hN ,v,NE
(8˜+ ϕhN1 )−ϕ
hN
2 −β˜−1
0(ϕhN3 )
H1,1,1,1,11,(1:1),0,(1:1)

1
8˜+ ϕhN1
1
(8˜+ ϕhN1 )
∣∣∣∣
(1+ϕhN2 +β˜,1)
(0,1);(1−ϕhN3 ,1)
−
(0,1);(0,1)

,
(32)
By substituting (33) and (12) into (29), the asymptotic expres-
sion for ergodic secrecy rate is thus obtained as in (32). 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide the numerical results to validate
our analysis in Section IV and investigate the secrecy outage
probability, probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate,
and ergodic secrecy rate of the considered network. The
binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) modulation is adopted in
the simulations with transmission block size S = 64 symbols.
The curves obtained via link-level simulations are denoted by
Ex, whereas the curves for analytical results are denoted by
An. In the following, we investigate the network performance
with various parameters to examine the effects of the degrees
of cooperative transmission, DoFs, and backhaul reliability.
A. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
Fig. 2 illustrates the secrecy outage probability for various
M and N . The network parameters are set as K = 3, λ =
0.995, {NR,NE ,NJ ,ND} = {2, 2, 2, 3}, and {˜αT , α˜E , α˜J } =
{10, 10, 10} dB. It can be observed that the number of
relays/eavesdroppers strongly affects the secrecy outage
probability. For example, when N = 1, the secrecy out-
age probability becomes lower when more relays help with
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FIGURE 2. Secrecy outage probability for various M,N of the proposed
network.
FIGURE 3. Secrecy outage probability for various K , λ of the proposed
network.
the cooperative transmission. Differently, when M = 1,
the secrecy outage probability becomes higher when the
number of eavesdroppers increases. This is due to the fact
that when the number of relays increases, the secrecy rate
becomes higher as a result of the reduction in the wiretap
channel capacity. Similarly, the secrecy rate decreases pro-
portionally to the increase in the number of eavesdroppers.
We further see that our analysis precisely matches the sim-
ulations and our analysis approaches the asymptotic results,
presented in Theorem 5, in the high SNR regime.
Fig. 3 plots the secrecy outage probability with various
K and λ. We set M = 2,N = 1, {NR,NE ,NJ ,ND} =
{2, 2, 3, 2}, and {˜αT , α˜E , α˜J } = {10, 10, 10} dB.
At λ = 0.95, we observe that when the number of
FIGURE 4. Secrecy outage probability for various DoFs and {α˜T , α˜E , α˜J } of
the proposed network.
transmitters increases, the secrecy outage probability pro-
foundly decreases, due to the increased received signal power
at D. When K = 1, the secrecy outage probability increases
when the backhaul reliability reduces from 0.95 to 0.85.
In contrast, the increase in the backhaul reliability, e.g.,
λ increases from 0.95 to 0.995, leads to a lower secrecy outage
probability.
In Fig. 4, we investigate the effects of DoFs and
{˜αT , α˜E , α˜J } on the secrecy outage probability. In the set-
tings, we set K = 3,M = 1,N = 2, λ = 0.98, and
{NR,NE ,NJ } = {2, 2, 4}. As ND increases, we observe that
the lower secrecy outage probability is achieved. We also
observe that as α˜T and α˜J increase, the secrecy outage proba-
bility becomes lower while the increase in α˜E results in high
achievable secrecy outage. It is clearly to see that the increase
in α˜T results in a high received power at the receiver while the
increase in α˜J reduces the SINR of the eavesdroppers.
B. PROBABILITY OF NON-ZERO ACHIEVABLE
SECRECY RATE
Fig. 5 shows the probability of non-zero achievable secrecy
rate for various M and N . The network parameters are set
as K = 3, λ = 0.995, {NR,NE ,NJ ,ND} = {2, 4, 2, 2}, and
{˜αT , α˜E , α˜J } = {10, 10, 10} dB. Again, we observe that the
analytical results precisely match the simulation ones, and
approach the asymptotic ones at high SNRs. We also see that
when N = 1, the increasingM leads to a higher Pr(CS > 0),
which implies that themain channel capacity is reliably larger
than the wiretap channel capacity. We further see that the
increase in the number of eavesdroppers degrades the non-
zero achievable secrecy probability.
In Fig. 6, the probability of non-zero achievable secrecy
rate is investigated for various K and λ. In this figure,
we set M = 2,N = 1, {NR,NE ,NJ ,ND} = {2, 2, 2, 2},
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FIGURE 5. Non-zero achievable secrecy rate probability for various M,N
of the proposed network.
FIGURE 6. Non-zero achievable secrecy rate probability for various K , λ
of the proposed network.
and {˜αT , α˜E , α˜J } = {10, 10, 10} dB. Similar to Fig. 3,
the increase in the number of transmitters leads to a higher
Pr(CS > 0), which is due to the increase in improved
main channel capacity. It has been proved that in the case
of λ = 0.92, Pr(CS > 0) for K = 3 outperforms those
for K = 1 and K = 2. Furthermore, we can observe that
at the same level of cooperative transmission, the backhaul
reliability gives strong impacts on Pr(CS > 0). Specifically,
a higher probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate is
achieved if the backhaul links are more reliable.
Fig. 7 plots the probability of non-zero achievable secrecy
rate for various DoFs and {˜αT , α˜E , α˜J } with the network
parameters are set as K = 3,M = 1,N = 1, and λ = 0.995.
We observe that when α˜D is very low, increasing ND leads
to a higher Pr(CS > 0). When α˜D is large, the impact of
FIGURE 7. Non-zero achievable secrecy rate probability for various DoFs
and {α˜T , α˜E , α˜J } of the proposed network.
FIGURE 8. Ergodic secrecy rate for variousM,N of the proposed network.
ND on Pr(CS > 0) is insignificant. Moreover, it can be seen
that decreasing α˜E can improve the network performance
due to the reduced achievable SINR at the eavesdroppers.
Furthermore, decreasing α˜T leads to a lowerPr(CS > 0) since
less received signal power is obtained at the receiver.
C. ERGODIC SECRECY RATE
Fig. 8 plots the ergodic secrecy rate for various M and N
with K = 3, λ = 0.92, {NR,NE ,NJ ,ND} = {2, 2, 2, 2}, and
{˜αT , α˜E , α˜J } = {10, 10, 10} dB. This figure shows, again,
the accuracy of our analysis. When N = 1, we observe that
the ergodic secrecy rate increases withM , which is due to the
increasing capacity at D. Differently, the increase in N when
M = 1 results in the decreased ergodic secrecy rate since the
eavesdropping capability increases.
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FIGURE 9. Ergodic secrecy rate for various K , λ of the proposed network.
Fig. 9 shows the ergodic capacity for various K and λ.
We set M = 2,N = 1, {NR,NE ,NJ ,ND} = {2, 2, 2, 2}, and
{˜αT , α˜E , α˜J } = {10, 10, 10} dB. From this figure, backhaul
reliability and the degrees of cooperative transmission reveal
their influence the network performance. We can see that
K = 3 provides the highest ergodic secrecy rate comparing
to K = 1 and K = 2 when λ = 0.96. For the non-cooperative
transmission (K = 1), the backhaul link with the highest
reliability λ = 0.995 results in the highest ergodic secrecy
rate, compared to λ = 0.92 and λ = 0.96.
FIGURE 10. Ergodic secrecy rate for various DoFs and {α˜T , α˜E , α˜J } of the
proposed network.
In Fig. 10, we investigate the ergodic secrecy rate with
various DoFs and {˜αT , α˜E , α˜J } with K = 3,M = 1,N = 2,
and λ = 0.92. In this figure, we observe that the increase
in ND has a positive effect on the network performance,
i.e.,ND = 3 results a higher ergodic secrecy rate thanND = 2
for α˜T = α˜E = α˜J = 10 dB. Also, changing the set
{˜αT , α˜E , α˜J } has a strong impact on the ergodic secrecy rate.
Specifically, the increase in α˜T and α˜J leads to an increase in
the ergodic secrecy rate while the increase in α˜E results in a
reduction in the ergodic secrecy capacity.
FIGURE 11. Impact of the dense networks on the secrecy outage
probability.
In Fig. 11, we show the effects of dense networks on
secrecy outage probability versus number of relays M with
K = 10, λ = 0.95, {NR,NE ,NJ ,ND} = {2, 2, 2, 2}, and
{˜αT , α˜E , α˜J , α˜D} = {10, 10, 10, 10} dB. It can be seen that
the secrecy outage probability almost decreases when more
relays cooperate in the network for all cases N = {0, 5, 10}.
Furthermore, the increase in the number of eavesdroppers
degrades the system performance since the achievable capac-
ity in the wiretap channels gets higher.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the impacts of unreliable backhaul links on
the secrecy performance of cooperative single carrier sys-
tems were investigated. To minimize as much information
overheard by the eavesdroppers while satisfying the instan-
taneous SNR at the receiver, a two-phase transmitter/relay
selection scheme was proposed. We then derived the exact
expressions for the critical secrecy performance metrics such
as secrecy outage probability, non-zero secrecy rate proba-
bility, and ergodic secrecy rate. The asymptotic expressions
were also attained to investigate the network performance at
high SNRs. Our results proved that backhaul reliability is
determined as an important parameter relative to the scaling
of the secrecy performance.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to the definition of the RV γ k,mR , which is given
as γ k,mR = α˜T ||hk,m||2Ik , the distribution of the RV γ k,mR is
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thus obtained as the product of the Bernoulli process Ik and
the random process α˜T ||hk,m||2 ∼ χ2 (2NR, α˜T ). From (6),
the PDF and CDF of the RV γ k,mR can be written as
f
γ
k,m
R
(x) = (1− λ)δ(x)+ λ
(˜αT )NR (NR − 1)!x
NR−1e−x/α˜T ,
F
γ
k,m
R
(x) = 1− λe−x/α˜T
NR−1∑
l=0
1
l!
(
x
α˜T
)l
, (A.1)
where δ(.) denotes the Dirac delta function. Since the best
transmitter Tk∗ is selected, the statistic of the RV γ
k∗,m
R =
max(γ 1,mR , . . . , γ
K ,m
R ) is given as
F
γ
k∗,m
R
(x) =
[
F
γ
k,m
R
(x)
]K
,
=
K∑
k=0
(
K
k
)
(−1)k
(
λe−x/α˜T
NR−1∑
l=0
1
l!
(
x
α˜T
)l)k
=
K∑
k=0
(
K
k
)
(−1)kλke−kx/α˜T
×
k∑
ω1,...,ωNR
(
k!
ω1! . . . ωNR !
)
x
∑NR−1
t=0 tωt+1∏NR−1
t=0 (t!(˜αT )t)ωt+1
.
(A.2)
After some simple manipulations, we arrive at (8).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
According to (4), the distribution of the RV γm,nE is ana-
lytically the joint distribution of the RV α˜m,nE ||gm,n||2 ∼
χ2 (2NE , α˜E ) and RV α˜nJ ||qn||2 ∼ χ2 (2NJ , α˜J ), which can
be obtained by
Fγm,nE (x) = E
{
Fα˜m,nE ||gm,n||2 ((1+ y)x) | α˜
n
J ||qn||2 = y
}
=
∫ ∞
0
(
1− e−(1+y)x/α˜E
NE−1∑
i=0
1
i!
(
(1+ y)x
α˜E
)i)
× 1
(˜αJ )NJ (NJ − 1)!y
NJ−1e−y/α˜J dy
= 1− 1
(˜αJ )NJ (NJ − 1)!
NE−1∑
i=0
1
i!(˜αE )i x
ie−x/α˜E
×
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)∫ ∞
0
yNJ+j−1e−y(1/α˜J+x/α˜E )dy
= 1− 1
(˜αJ )NJ (NJ − 1)!
NE−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
0(NJ + j)
i!(˜αE )i
× x ie−x/α˜E
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−(NJ+j)
. (B.1)
Since the frequency selective fading channels between the
particular relay to the eavesdroppers are i.i.d. RVs, the CDF
of the RV γm,n
∗
E is given as
F
γ
m,n∗
E
(x)
= [Fγm,nE (x)]
N
=
N∑
n=0
(
N
n
)
(−1)n
(
e−x/α˜E
(˜αJ )NJ (NJ − 1)!
)n
×
(NE−1∑
l=0
l∑
r=0
(
l
r
)
0(NJ + r)
l!(˜αE )l
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−(NJ+r)
x l
)n
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
(B.2)
By applying binomial and multinomial theorems, J1 is
obtained as (B.3) at the top of next page.
Substituting (B.3) into (B.2), the CDF of the RV γm,n
∗
E is
thus attained as in (10).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to the definition of the RV γm
∗,n∗
E in (9), which
is given by γm
∗,n∗
E = min (γ 1,n
∗
E , . . . , γ
M ,n∗
E ), the PDF of
γ
m∗,n∗
E can be mathematically expressed based on the order
statistics as
f
γ
m∗,n∗
E
(x) = Mf
γ
m,n∗
E
(x)
[
1− F
γ
m,n∗
E
(x)
]M−1
. (C.1)
From (C.1), f
γ
m,n∗
E
(x) can be calculated by taking the first
derivative of the CDF of the RV γm,n
∗
E , which is derived
in (10). The expression f
γ
m,n∗
E
(x) is thus obtained as in (C.2)
at the top of next page, where J2 is derived similarly to
Lemma 1 with {ϕN−11 , ϕN−12 , ϕN−13 } is the set of parameters
corresponding to
∑̂
N−1,l,NE
.
Again binomial and multinomial theorems for[
1− F
γ
m,n∗
E
(x)
]M−1
, yields[
1− F
γ
m,n∗
E
(x)
]M−1
=
M−1∑
m=0
(
M − 1
m
)
(−1)m
[
1− 1
(˜αJ )NJ (NJ − 1)!
NE−1∑
l=0
l∑
r=0
×
(
l
r
)
0(NJ + r)
l!(˜αE )l x
le−x/α˜E
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−(NJ+r)]mN
=
M−1∑
m=0
(
M − 1
m
)
(−1)m
×
∑̂
mN ,r,NE
e−ϕmN1 xxϕmN2
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−ϕmN3
, (C.3)
where [.]mN is evaluated similarly to Lemma 1 and
{ϕmN1 , ϕmN2 , ϕmN3 } is the set of parameters corresponding to∑̂
mN ,r,NE
.
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J1 =
N∑
n=0
(
N
n
)
(−1)n
(
e−x/α˜E
(˜αJ )NJ (NJ − 1)!
)n n∑
ϑ1,...,ϑNE
(
n!
ϑ1! . . . ϑNE !
)
1∏NE−1
t=0 (t!(˜αE )t)ϑt+1
x
∑NE−1
t=0 tϑt+1
×
 0∑
r1=0
(
0
r1
)
0(NJ + r1)
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−(NJ+r1)ϑ1  1∑
r2=0
(
1
r2
)
0(NJ + r2)
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−(NJ+r2)ϑ2 . . .
×
NE−1∑
rNE=0
(
NE − 1
rNE
)
0(NJ + rNE )
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−(NJ+rNE )ϑNE
=
N∑
n=0
(
N
n
)
(−1)n
(
e−x/α˜E
(˜αJ )NJ (NJ − 1)!
)n n∑
ϑ1,...,ϑNE
(
n!
ϑ1! . . . ϑNE !
)
1∏NE−1
t=0 (t!(˜αE )t)ϑt+1
x
∑NE−1
t=0 tϑt+1
×
ϑ1∑
µ1,1
(
ϑ1!
µ1,1!
) 0∏
η1=0
[(
0
η1
)
0(NJ + η1)
]µ1,η1+1 ( 1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−∑0η1=0(NJ+η1)µ1,η1+1
×
ϑ2∑
µ2,1,µ2,2
(
ϑ2!
µ2,1!µ2,2!
) 1∏
η2=0
[(
1
η2
)
0(NJ + η2)
]µ2,η2+1 ( 1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−∑1η2=0(NJ+η2)µ2,η2+1
. . .
×
ϑNE∑
µNE ,1,...,µNE ,NE
(
ϑNE !
µNE ,1! . . . µNE ,NE !
)NE−1∏
ηNE=0
[(
NE − 1
ηNE
)
0(NJ + ηNE )
]µNE ,ηNE +1( 1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−∑NE−1ηNE =0(NJ+ηNE )µNE ,ηNE +1
(B.3)
f
γ
m,n∗
E
(x) =
∂F
γ
m,n∗
E
(x)
∂x
= N
(˜αJ )NJ (NJ − 1)!
NE−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
0(NJ + j)
i!(˜αE )i
(
1/α˜J + NJ + j− i
α˜E
x i − i
α˜J
x i−1 + 1
(˜αE )2
x i+1
)
e−x/α˜E
×
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−(NJ+j+1) [
1− 1
(˜αJ )NJ (NJ − 1)!
NE−1∑
l=0
l∑
r=0
(
l
r
)
0(NJ + r)
l!(˜αE )l
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−(NJ+r)
x le−x/α˜E
]N−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J2
= N
(˜αJ )NJ (NJ − 1)!
NE−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
0(NJ + j)
i!(˜αE )i
(
1/α˜J + NJ + j− i
α˜E
x i − i
α˜J
x i−1 + 1
(˜αE )2
x i+1
)
e−x/α˜E
×
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−(NJ+j+1) ∑̂
N−1,l,NE
e−ϕ
N−1
1 xxϕ
N−1
2
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−ϕN−13
. (C.2)
By substituting (C.2), (C.3) into (C.1) and after some
manipulations, the PDF of the RV γm
∗,n∗
E is thus obtained as
in (12).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
From the definition of the secrecy outage probability, by sub-
stituting (16) and (12) into (20), the secrecy outage prob-
ability expression is thus obtained as (D.1) at the top of
next page, where J3 can be evaluated by using the help
of [30, Eq. (2.3.6.9)] with 9 (a, b, c) = 1
0(a)
∫∞
0 e
−ct tb−a
(1+t)b−a−1dt denotes the confluent hypergeometric function
[32, eq. (9.211.4)]. After some manipulations, we arrive
at (21).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
According to the order statistics, the CDF of the RV γm
∗,n∗
E
in (30) can be expressed as
F
γ
m∗,n∗
E
(x) = 1− [1− F
γ
m,n∗
E
(x)]M
= 1−
M∑
h=0
(
M
h
)
(−1)h[F
γ
m,n∗
E
(x)]h
= 1−
M∑
h=0
(
M
h
)
(−1)h[Fγm,nE (x)]
hN , (E.1)
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Pout (θ ) =
∫ ∞
0
[
1+
∑˜
D
(ϒ − 1+ ϒx)βe−8 (ϒ−1+ϒx)
]
Q
∑˜
E
e−ϕ˜1 x
(
B1 x ϕ˜2 − B2 x ϕ˜2−1 + B3 x ϕ˜2+1
)( 1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−ϕ˜3
dx
= 1+Q
∑˜
D
∑˜
E
β∑
α=0
(
β
α
)
(ϒ − 1)β−α(θ )αe−8 (ϒ−1)
×
∫ ∞
0
e−(8ϒ+ϕ˜1)x
(
B1 x ϕ˜2+α − B2 x ϕ˜2+α−1 + B3 x ϕ˜2+α+1
)( 1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−ϕ˜3
dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
J3
, (D.1)
Cerg = − 12 ln(2)

∑˜
D
∫ ∞
0
xβe−8x
1+ x︸ ︷︷ ︸
J4
−
∑˜
D
M∑
h=0
(
M
h
)
(−1)hα˜ϕ
hN
3
J
∑̂
hN ,v,NE
∫ ∞
0
e−(8+ϕhN1 )xxϕhN2 +β
(1+ x) (1+ x/)ϕhN3︸ ︷︷ ︸
J5
, (E.3)
where [F
γ
m,n∗
E
(x)]hN can be evaluated similarly to Lemma 1,
yields
F
γ
m∗,n∗
E
(x) = 1−
M∑
h=0
(
M
h
)
(−1)h
×
∑̂
hN ,v,NE
e−ϕhN1 xxϕhN2
(
1
α˜J
+ x
α˜E
)−ϕhN3
, (E.2)
where {ϕhN1 , ϕhN2 , ϕhN3 } is the set of parameters correspond-
ing to
∑̂
hN ,v,NE
. By substituting (E.2) and (16) into (29),
the ergodic secrecy rate expression can be written as (E.3)
at the top of this page,
where J4 can be evaluated by using the help of [30,
eq. (2.3.6.9)], yields
J4 = 0(β + 1)9 (β + 1, β + 1,8) , (E.4)
In (E.3), J5 is in the complex integral form. To evaluate
J5, we first express the product of elementary (1+ x)−1 and
(1+ x/)−ϕhN3 in terms of Fox H-function with the help of
[33, Appendix A7] as
1
1+ x = H
11
11
[
x
∣∣∣∣ (0, 1)(0, 1)
]
,
1
(1+ x/)ϕhN3
= 1
0(ϕhN3 )
H1111
[
x

∣∣∣∣ (1− ϕhN3 , 1)(0, 1)
]
, (E.5)
where Hmnpq [.] denotes the Fox H-function [33, Eq. (1.1.1)].
Applying the integral transform for J5 with the help of [33,
eq. (2.6.2)], yields
J5 = (8+ ϕ
hN
1 )
−ϕhN2 −β−1
0(ϕhN3 )
× H1,1,1,1,11,(1:1),0,(1:1)

1
8+ ϕhN1
1
(8+ ϕhN1 )
∣∣∣∣
(1+ϕhN2 +β,1)
(0,1);(1−ϕhN3 ,1)
−
(0,1);(0,1)
, (E.6)
where HL,N ,N
′,M ,M ′
E,(A:C),F,(B:D) [.] is the generalized Fox H-function
[33, eq. (2.2.1)]. Substituting (E.4) and (E.6) into (E.3),
we arrive at (31).
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